Encryption and protection · Italian app
What you write to each other, only you can read.
Claspet encrypts messages, photos, files, voice messages and calls on your phone, and opens them only on the devices of the people who receive them. Our server delivers sealed envelopes: it doesn't have the keys, so it cannot open them. Here we explain how, how far the protection goes, and where it stops.
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Always
end-to-end encrypted
Every conversation, one-to-one or in a group, and every call. There is nothing to turn on.
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ML-KEM
against quantum computers
In one-to-one messages, together with classical encryption. Not yet in groups, and not in calls.
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No
phone number, email or address book
All an account needs is a name, even a nickname.
Who it protects you from
“End-to-end encrypted” means a message is locked on the phone of the person writing and unlocked only on the phone of the person reading. Nobody in between has the key: not even us.
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From us
The Claspet server delivers envelopes it cannot open: the keys are on the phones. When we say we cannot read, it is because we don't have the keys, not because we decided not to look. And there are no ads or profiling in the app. Optional technical fault reports and daily service totals are described in the privacy policy.
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From whoever is on the network
The café Wi-Fi, your carrier, anyone intercepting traffic: they see whom your phone talks to, and how much. That is our server, the custodians when you set up or use recovery and, in a direct call, the other person's phone. They don't see what you say or what you send each other.
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From someone who broke into the server
They would find encrypted envelopes and unreadable attachments, plus what the server knows, listed further down. They could try to hand you a fake key: that is what the transparency log and the safety number are for.
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From Apple and Google
The notifications that pass through them contain neither the message nor the sender's name. The backup you put in iCloud Drive or Google Drive, from version 1.1, reaches them already encrypted.
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From whoever records today to decrypt tomorrow
In one-to-one messages the key also comes from ML-KEM-768, NIST's post-quantum standard: breaking the classical encryption with a quantum computer will not be enough to open messages recorded today. This does not apply to groups or calls. And the envelope that hides the sender is classical only: a quantum computer would reveal who wrote, not what.
Against someone holding your unlocked phone, though, encryption does not help: they read what you read. This and the other limits are at the bottom, in “What encryption doesn't do”.
Layer by layer
Every part of Claspet has its own protection, and each one has a limit, which we write right next to it.
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One-to-one messages
The first time you write to someone, your phone and theirs agree on a secret nobody else knows, starting from the public keys their phone left on the server. Those keys are signed by their identity, and your phone checks the signatures before using them.
From then on every message is locked with a new key, which is thrown away after use. Someone who had recorded your encrypted messages and one day stole the conversation's keys of that moment would not open the ones already past; and as soon as the other person replies, they would be locked out of the next ones too.
X25519, classical encryption, and ML-KEM-768, post-quantum encryption, contribute to the secret together; and ML-KEM comes back into play every eight turns of the conversation. Opening those messages would mean breaking both.
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Groups
Groups use MLS, the IETF standard for encrypted group messaging (RFC 9420), with the OpenMLS library. The group's name and the list of its members travel encrypted, like the messages.
Every device is a member of the group, visible to all the others. When someone leaves or is removed, the group changes keys, and the following messages no longer open for them.
The limit. Groups don't have post-quantum protection yet: against someone recording traffic to decrypt it in the future, a group today is less protected than a one-to-one conversation.
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Photos, videos, files and voice messages
Every attachment is encrypted on the phone with a new key of its own, and that key travels inside the encrypted message. What stays on the server is a block of bytes that means nothing without the key, for thirty days at most. Large files are sent in pieces, and each piece is bound to its place: nobody can remove or shuffle them without the file failing to open.
Before encryption, messages and attachments are brought to fixed sizes: the server sees a size band, not the real length. The first band is wide enough to hold practically every text message, so they can't be told apart.
The limit. A large file remains recognisable by its size: above one megabyte the rounding hides little. And once every eight turns the post-quantum refresh makes the envelope more than two kilobytes larger, and that shows.
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Calls
Audio and video calls, on iPhone today, are set up inside the encrypted message channel: the server cannot read the call offer, with the addresses needed to connect. Voice and video then travel encrypted with DTLS-SRTP, the WebRTC scheme, and the fingerprint that ties that encryption to your call also goes through the encrypted channel. On Android, calls will come with an update.
The limit. Voice and video don't use our ML-KEM: the post-quantum protection of one-to-one messages does not extend to calls. If the two phones connect directly, each sees the other's network address, as in any direct call over the internet. If they go through our relay, the relay sees both parties' addresses but not the content. To make a phone ring while the app is closed, the server has to know that a delivery is a call, and on iPhone Apple sees it too; on the sealed route the server doesn't know who is calling. And voice and video go through libwebrtc, a third-party component we don't review line by line.
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What the server sees, and what it doesn't
It cannot read
- The text of messages, photos, videos, files, voice messages, shared locations and polls.
- Calls.
- The names you give your contacts, group names and who is in each group.
- Private keys, which are born on the phones: the server only gets the public ones and, if you turn on recovery, an encrypted deposit that holds the account key, locked by your phrase and the custodians (see “Backup and recovery”).
It knows
- That your account exists, since when and with which devices, and the display name you chose.
- When you connect and from which network address; and, to show it only to you, the time of each of your devices' last connection.
- That messages are waiting for someone, how large they are, in size bands, and when they arrived.
- Who sent them, when they don't take the sealed route (below).
- And more, listed in full in the privacy policy: reports, the tokens Apple and Google use to wake the app, encrypted attachments, the recovery deposit and the encrypted contact list if you have them, group identifiers and when groups change keys.
Sealed sender. Claspet has two ways to deliver. On the sealed route the sender is shut inside a second envelope, which only the recipient's key opens: the server knows whom to deliver to, not whom it comes from. The app normally uses it when it has the recipient's access key, even for the first message if that person has made it public; in a few cases, for instance if the server rejects a key just received, it falls back to the other route. When it doesn't have it, the message goes through the connection the app keeps open in the foreground, and there the sender is written in clear on the envelope, which stays queued until the recipient confirms, thirty days at most, and, encrypted, in the server's backup copies for the time stated in the privacy policy.
Access logs. Service API access logs and system and relay logs are still configured in the existing archive for up to seventy-two months, under review by category and purpose. This is not a general legal obligation covering every technical log. API access logs record address, port, time and request path, without message contents or usernames; they remain unencrypted on the server for at most sixty-four days before encrypted archiving. Unencrypted system logs depend on the configured storage limit and log volume, not a guaranteed one-year period. Website access logs are separate and kept for thirty days. See the privacy policy for details and historical records.
The limit. Even on the sealed route the server sees which network address an envelope comes from, and when. As long as the app is connected from an address, what leaves that address can be matched to your account, unless others use the same address too. The full list of what the server knows, and for how long it keeps it, is in the privacy policy.
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Against a server that cheats
The strongest encryption is useless if the server hands you the wrong key: you would encrypt, perfectly, for someone else. It is the most serious attack on any encrypted messenger, and Claspet has two defences.
The transparency log. A public, append-only log binds every username to its public key. The app checks it for every new contact and verifies that the history of that name is consistent with what it had already seen: if a proof doesn't hold, it doesn't send. To swap a key the server would have to write it into the log, and from there it can never be erased. An auditor, a program with a user and keys separate from the service, checks that the log hasn't been rewritten and signs its root: if the signed root and the one served by the server disagree, sending stops.
The safety number. Sixty digits, the same on both phones, derived from your two identities: you find it in the conversation menu. Read it out loud, in person or over a phone call; on iPhone you can also scan their personal code. If it matches, there is nobody between you: it is the only defence that depends neither on us nor on the log. If their identity changes, the app tells you in the conversation.
The limit. Today the auditor runs on the same machine as the server, and we run it: it protects against a service that goes wrong or is compromised on its own, not against whoever administers the machine and lies consistently from the start to a newly installed phone. Against that case there is the safety number.
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On your phone
The conversation archive is encrypted on the phone, the content of every row, with a key kept by the system: on iPhone in the keychain, tied to that phone; on Android wrapped by a key that never leaves the phone. Photos and files stay in the encrypted form in which they arrived, and to search your messages the app keeps no index in clear.
You can make messages disappear after a time you choose, and turn on capture protection in a conversation, which blacks out screenshots and screen recordings.
The limit. Someone with your unlocked phone, or spyware running on it, reads what you read: the archive is as safe as the phone. Protect it with a strong passcode. On iPhone, after the first unlock since it was switched on, the archive key stays available even with the screen locked, so that notifications can be decrypted; and a notification can show the text on the lock screen, if the phone shows previews. While you look at a photo, a video or a file, a copy in clear exists on the phone, which the app removes when you close it. And whatever you save or share outside Claspet leaves its protection.
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Backup and recovery
The backup from version 1.1. Chats, photos and files go into a folder you choose, in iCloud Drive or Google Drive, encrypted on the phone with a key derived from your account key, the one on your re-entry sheet. Apple and Google see unreadable bytes, plus the file names, their sizes and when they change. We don't receive the backup. Without the sheet, it doesn't open on a new phone, unless you come back with a password-protected backup, which carries the same key.
Contacts and groups on the server from version 1.1. So that whoever loses their phone finds their people again, the server keeps a list of contacts and groups encrypted with a key derived from your account key: the server doesn't have it, except locked inside the recovery deposit, below, and then that limit applies. It contains no messages, and you can turn it off in Settings.
Recovery, optional. With the re-entry sheet, which carries a code and a phrase, you get your account back on a new phone. The server keeps an encrypted deposit that holds your identity, that is your account key, and not your messages. The key that opens it can only be obtained with your phrase and the answer of three “custodians”, three servers that count the attempts: one on the same machine as the Claspet server, two on other machines we run.
The limit. We run the three custodians: they stop someone trying to guess the phrase, not whoever runs the Claspet servers. The deposit holds the account key, which also opens the contacts and groups on the server and the backup: against whoever runs the servers, only the phrase stands. The six words the app suggests, picked at random, are worth 48 bits; a phrase you choose yourself can be worth much less.
An Italian app, under European rules
Claspet is made in Italy. The data controller is an Italian company, the Terms of Use are governed by Italian law, and data is processed under the European General Data Protection Regulation, the GDPR. You can lodge a complaint with the Italian data protection authority, the Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, or with the authority of the country where you live.
Notifications go through Apple and Google, who may also process them in the United States: the message is not inside.
If an authority asks us for data, we hand it over only when the law requires it, and we can only hand over what exists, listed in full in the privacy policy. New spam reports do not include messages; historical records, if any, are described there.
For those who want the details
The algorithms, with references to the standards. PQXDH and the Double Ratchet follow the schemes published by Signal, but we wrote them ourselves, in Rust, with no Signal code. The ML-KEM refresh every eight Double Ratchet steps, on the other hand, is our own construction, and is not in those specifications. The cryptographic primitives come from existing Rust libraries, groups from OpenMLS, calls from WebRTC.
- First one-to-one message
- PQXDH: three X25519 exchanges, four when the recipient still has a one-time key, plus an ML-KEM-768 encapsulation, combined and passed through HKDF-SHA256. The prekeys, classical and ML-KEM, are signed with Ed25519 by the recipient's identity, and the signatures are checked before use; the signed classical one is renewed every seven days.
- One-to-one messages
- Double Ratchet, with a single-use key for each message, and a fresh ML-KEM-768 encapsulation every eight ratchet steps.
- Encryption
- ChaCha20-Poly1305, authenticated encryption; the nonce is derived from the message counter.
- Signatures and derivation
- Ed25519 for signatures; HKDF-SHA256, with fixed domain labels, to derive keys.
- Groups
- MLS (RFC 9420) with OpenMLS 0.9, cipher suite
MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519. Every device is a leaf of the tree. Not post-quantum. - Sealed sender
- A second envelope to the recipient's identity key: X25519 with a fresh ephemeral key for every envelope, HKDF-SHA256, ChaCha20-Poly1305, with the content brought to a size band before encryption. This layer is classical only, not post-quantum.
- Size bands
- The first band is 512 bytes, and each following band is one and a half times the previous one, up to the last, of 1,134,991 bytes; beyond that, sizes are rounded to multiples of 256 KiB. Attachments above 1 MiB go straight to multiples of 256 KiB.
- Attachments
- A random 32-byte key for each attachment, ChaCha20-Poly1305; large files in 1 MiB pieces, with the position and total number of pieces in the authenticated data of each.
- Transparency log
- Merkle tree as in RFC 6962, with inclusion and consistency proofs verified by the app, which doesn't send if a proof fails; the root is signed by the auditor with Ed25519.
- Safety number
- Sixty digits in twelve groups of five, from SHA-256 repeated 5,200 times over each of the two identities.
- Archive on the phone
- The content of each row encrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305 under a subkey derived with HKDF from a random 32-byte salt. For messages, time, direction, state and expiry stay in clear; the conversation is identified by a blind index, not by the address. The archive key is in the iOS keychain, available after first unlock and only on that device; on Android it is encrypted by an Android Keystore key.
- Calls
- WebRTC with DTLS-SRTP; offer, candidates and DTLS fingerprint travel inside Claspet's encrypted channel. The DTLS key exchange doesn't use our ML-KEM. WebRTC is libwebrtc, taken as a prebuilt package, version 152.
- Connection to the server
- HTTPS to
api.claspet.com, underneath the end-to-end encryption.
The standards
- RFC 9420, The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol
- FIPS 203, Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM), NIST
- PQXDH and Double Ratchet, the specifications published by Signal
- RFC 7748 (X25519), RFC 8032 (Ed25519), RFC 8439 (ChaCha20-Poly1305), RFC 5869 (HKDF)
- RFC 6962, Certificate Transparency, for the log's tree, and RFC 5764, DTLS-SRTP
We have not yet published an independent audit: this page describes how the program is built, it is not a certification. If you find a flaw, Reporting a security flaw (in Italian) explains how to send it to us.
What encryption doesn't do
A security page that keeps quiet about the limits is asking to be believed. These are ours.
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It doesn't protect an unlocked phone
Someone holding your unlocked phone, or spyware running on it, reads what you read. On iPhone, after the first unlock since it was switched on, the archive key stays available even with the screen locked, and notifications can show the text.
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It doesn't decide for the recipient
Whoever receives a message can copy it, forward it, photograph the screen with another phone or share it outside the app. Disappearing messages and capture protection don't prevent that.
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It doesn't hide everything around the message
The server sees which network address you connect from and when, whom an envelope is for and how large it is, in size bands; it sees the display name you chose; and it sees the sender when the envelope doesn't take the sealed route. Size bands hide how long a message is, not when it leaves or how many leave. For groups it knows the identifiers and when keys change: it doesn't read who is in them, but can infer it from deliveries that leave together from the same address.
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It doesn't hide your address from the person you call
In a direct call each side sees the other's network address.
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It isn't post-quantum everywhere
Protection against quantum computers exists in one-to-one messages, not yet in groups. Voice and video don't use our ML-KEM: the post-quantum protection of one-to-one messages does not extend to calls. And the envelope that hides the sender is classical only.
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The log alone isn't enough against whoever controls the server
Today the auditor is on the same machine as the server. Against whoever administers it and lies from the start, the defence is the safety number compared out loud.
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Recovery trusts whoever runs the servers
We run the custodians: they count the attempts of anyone trying to guess your phrase, but they don't stop whoever runs the Claspet servers. The deposit holds the account key, which also opens the contacts and groups on the server and the backup: against whoever runs the servers, only the phrase stands. Keep the phrase the app suggests, or don't turn on recovery.
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Notifications go through Apple and Google
They see that there is a notification for a given phone, and when; on iPhone, Apple also sees whether it is a call. The message is not inside.
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Spam reports contain no messages
The report sends account identifiers, a fixed spam category and time. No conversation text or attachment is shared. The signal is not anonymous and does not prove what was said.
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Calls use third-party code
Voice and video go through libwebrtc, taken as a prebuilt package: a component we don't review line by line. Message encryption doesn't go through it.
This page describes the program as of 28 October 2026. It applies to Claspet 1.0; the parts marked “1.1” come with the next update, which is in preparation. If the program changes, so does this page.